The CLARITY Act's Developer Protection Has a Trojan Horse
Section 604 of the CLARITY Act, titled the "Blockchain Regulatory Certainty Act," has been positioned as the biggest win for open-source developers in the entire 309-page bill. The headline is compelling: if you build blockchain software and don't have unilateral control over users' funds, you are not a money transmitter. Not under FinCEN rules, not under federal criminal law, not under state registration requirements. Writing code does not equal money transmission.
Then you read subsection (d).
Lauren Rodriguez flagged the problem in a quote-tweet of our post about Section 604 this morning. Subsection (d), titled "Clarification of Treatment," explicitly states that the protections in subsection (c) do not modify the application of 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(C). That is the exact federal statute that has been used to prosecute software developers. It criminalizes money transmission involving funds "known" to be derived from a criminal offense or intended for unlawful activity.
Here is where it gets dangerous: the word "known" in federal criminal law does not mean what you think it means. Prosecutors do not need to prove that a developer had specific knowledge of a specific criminal transaction. They need to prove that the developer knew their software was being used for criminal purposes and continued operating it anyway. Every developer of a privacy tool, every builder of a non-custodial wallet, every maintainer of a mixing protocol knows that somewhere, someone is using their tool for something illegal. That general knowledge, under aggressive prosecution theory, is enough to trigger 1960(b)(1)(C).
This is not hypothetical. This is what happened to Keonne Rodriguez and William Hill of Samourai Wallet. Both pleaded guilty to conspiracy to operate an unlicensed money transmitting business. Rodriguez is currently serving a five-year federal sentence. The prosecution's theory: they built a privacy tool, they knew criminals used it, and they kept building. Roman Storm of Tornado Cash was convicted on the same 1960 charge after the DOJ dropped the (b)(1)(B) registration count and proceeded solely on (b)(1)(C), the "knowledge" prong.
Peter Van Valkenburgh, Executive Director of Coin Center, offered a more measured read. He argues the language in subsection (d) is actually narrow: it preserves the ability to charge under 1960 only when a person "acts with the specific intent to transfer, on behalf of another person, funds that are known to be" criminal. That is two separate requirements: specific intent to move someone else's money, plus actual knowledge that those specific funds are dirty. Van Valkenburgh's position: if someone emails you asking for help laundering funds and you do it, you are not safe. But merely building a tool that bad actors might use does not meet this bar.
The problem is that the Samourai and Tornado Cash cases demonstrate prosecutors can bridge that gap by pointing to developers' own communications, marketing materials, and awareness of how their tools are used. The DOJ's position, validated by a jury in the Storm case, is that maintaining a protocol while knowing it facilitates crime satisfies the "specific intent" and "knowledge" requirements. The legal text reads narrow. The prosecution theory reads broad. And that gap is where developers go to prison.
So Section 604 gives with one hand and takes away with the other. It says you're not a money transmitter for building open-source software. But it preserves the exact criminal statute that has already put developers in prison for building open-source software. The protection is real in theory, hollow in practice. As long as 1960(b)(1)(C) remains the carve-out, any developer who builds privacy tools and is aware of their misuse is potentially exposed to federal criminal liability regardless of the safe harbor in subsection (c).
The Senate Banking Committee marks up the CLARITY Act on Thursday. If the industry wants Section 604 to actually mean something, the (d) carve-out needs to be narrowed to require proof of direct, intentional facilitation of a specific criminal act, not general awareness that a tool could be misused. Otherwise, this is a press release disguised as a protection.
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