Private Credit Is Gating Redemptions and the Contagion Path Is Clear
Apollo Global capped redemptions from its $25 billion flagship private credit fund, Apollo Debt Solutions, at 5% of outstanding shares yesterday after investors requested withdrawals of approximately 11.2%. The fund honored roughly $730 million of the more than $1.5 billion requested. This morning, Ares Management followed with the same playbook, capping its Strategic Income Fund withdrawals at 5% after clients sought to redeem 11.6% of shares.
These aren't small funds run by nobodies. Apollo and Ares are two of the largest alternative asset managers in the world. And they're not alone. Blackstone, BlackRock, Morgan Stanley, and Cliffwater have collectively received more than $10.1 billion in redemption requests this quarter. The industry has agreed to honor only about 70% of those demands. Goldman Sachs analysts predict the retail private credit sector could shed between $45 billion and $70 billion in assets over the next two years, reversing the explosive growth that saw these funds balloon from $34 billion in 2021 to $222 billion by the end of last year.
The structural problem is straightforward: these semi-liquid funds offer investors periodic redemption windows while holding illiquid direct loans to companies that cannot be quickly sold. When everyone heads for the exit at once, the fund manager has two choices: gate redemptions or fire-sale assets at distressed prices. Both outcomes confirm what short sellers have been betting on. As we reported last week, JPMorgan and Goldman have been building tools to short this market. That was the signal. Now the gates are going up.
The contagion path is worth mapping: private credit funds gate redemptions, NAV marks become suspect because exits confirm the bid is lower than reported value, CLO tranches backed by these loans get repriced, bank balance sheets holding CLO exposure take hits, credit tightening follows, and public equity multiples compress. Mohamed El-Erian, the former co-chief executive of Pimco, has compared the current situation to the early stages of the 2008 financial crisis.
Alternative asset stocks are already pricing this in. Blackstone, KKR, Blue Owl, and Ares have each declined 25% or more this year, wiping out more than $100 billion in combined market value. The "uncorrelated returns" pitch is dead. When your fund gates at 5% and you wanted 11%, you discover that illiquidity premium is just another way of saying "you can't leave."
This is the core problem with using productive assets as collateral: they are inherently illiquid. Private credit funds hold direct loans to companies. You can't sell a bespoke corporate loan on a Sunday afternoon. There's no 24/7 global order book for middle-market debt. When redemptions spike, fund managers have to either gate withdrawals or dump assets into a market with no natural buyers, which craters the NAV for everyone still in the fund. Compare that to bitcoin. Bitcoin trades around the clock, 365 days a year, on dozens of liquid exchanges across every jurisdiction on earth. You can liquidate a billion dollars of bitcoin at 3am on Christmas morning and the market absorbs it. No gates. No lockup periods. No praying for a buyer. This is why bitcoin's collateral profile is structurally superior to anything in the private credit universe. The same property that critics dismiss as "volatility" is actually liquidity, the ability to exit at any time at a market price. Private credit promised stability and delivered a locked door. Bitcoin promises nothing except a market that never closes.
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